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Abstract
This paper exploits a rich collection of household surveys to investigate the wage
differential between the public and private sectors in 17 Latin American countries during
the 1980s and 1990s.  The paper also studies how the sector of employment affects the
gender wage gap.  The paper finds very small premia for male workers and large and
significant  premia for female workers.  The paper also finds that, on average, Latin
American women earn 30 percent less than men with similar skills and that approximately
one third of this gender gap results from lack of access to formal sector employment.
JEL Codes: H50, J45
Keywords: Public Sector Labor Market, Wage Gender Gap, Latin America45
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to document, and make available to researchers, the evidence
on public versus private sector pay differentials and the wage-gender gap in Latin
America.  Wage differentials between the public and private sectors and gender gaps are
estimated using data from 61 household survey, covering 17 Latin American countries
over the 1981-1998 period.  For each survey, the paper estimates public sector premia for
men and women, gender gaps in the public and private sectors, and the differential in
discrimination between the two sectors.
While the paper only reports country averages and, when relevant, discusses the
within-country time evolution of the variable of interest, the full data a set is available to
researchers interested in performing in-depth country studies.
1  Hopefully, the availability
of such a data set will stimulate research aimed at answering what are the causes and
consequences of the public/private wage differential and gender gap observed in the data.
In particular, one interesting avenue of research would be the study of the relationship
between public sector wages and the performance of the public sector (Van Rijckeghem
and Weder, 1997 and Wei, 2000).
This paper relates to two strands of literature in labor economics.  The first is the
literature on earning differentials between male and female workers, and the second is the
literature that studies public versus private pay differentials.  While it is well documented
that, both in OECD and developing countries, women earn wages that are significantly
lower than the wages earned by males with similar skills (Goldin, 1990, Blau and Kahn,
1996, and Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos, 1992), studies comparing the earnings of public
and private sector employees are often limited to OECD countries (Gregory and Borland,
1999 is an excellent survey). To the best of my knowledge, the only studies of developing
countries are those of Tanzania (Lindauer and Sabot, 1983), Chile (Corbo and Stelcner,
1983), Haiti (Terrell, 1993), Costa Rica (Gindling, 1991), and Ivory Coast (Van der Gaag
and Vijverberg 1988).
                                                       
1 The data-set can be downloaded from: http://www.iadb.org/OCE/publications.htm.6
The main findings of this paper are that, in most Latin American countries, there
are not large differences between the wages of male workers employed in the public and
private sectors.  However, the paper finds that the public sector pays a significant
premium to female workers (especially to those with low skills).  As for the gender gap,
the paper finds that Latin American women working in the private sector earn 30 percent
less than men with similar skills and that approximately one third of this gender gap is due
to lack of access to the formal sector.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data.  Section 3
discusses the methodology used to estimate the public sector premium and gender gap.
Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes and suggests how the  data-set
developed in this paper could be used to study the determinants and consequence of
public-private pay differentials.
2. The Data
While several developing countries have good household surveys, different methodologies
in data collection and different definition of the variables make cross-country comparisons
extremely difficult.  In this work, I use household surveys for 17 Latin American and
Caribbean countries that have uniform coding in their questions on human capital
investment and labor market participation.  For some countries (Guatemala, Mexico, and
Nicaragua), I was only able to find one survey where it was possible to identify workers
employed in the public sector. For several other countries, I was able to use several
surveys that cover the 1980s and 1990s.  Table 1 reports the countries studied in this
paper and the years in which the surveys were collected.7
            Table 1: Surveys used in the paper
Country Year
Bolivia 1990, 1993, 1996, 1997
Brazil 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997,
Chile 1987, 1996
Colombia 1990, 1991, 1993, 1997, 1998, 1999
Costa Rica 1983, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997
Ecuador 1995, 1998
El Salvador 1995, 1997, 1998
Guatemala 1998
Honduras 1989, 1992, 1996, 1997, 1998
Mexico 1994
Nicaragua 1993
Panama 1979, 1991, 1995, 1997
Paraguay 1995, 1998
Peru 1985, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1997
Rep. Dominicana 1996
Uruguay 1981, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1997
Venezuela 1981, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1995, 1997
Before discussing the empirical strategy, I briefly describe the composition of
employment in the 17 Latin American countries studied in this paper.  I start by calculating
the share of workers employed in the public sector.
2
The Latin American averages are reported in Table 2, and detailed data are
reported in Table A1 in the Appendix.
3  While, on average, 16 percent of employed people
work for the public sector, more than 30 percent of the workers with high education are
employed in the public sector.
4  The second part of Table 2 shows that 40 percent of men
who work in the formal sector and 60 percent of women who work in the formal sector
are employed by the public sector, with the public sector absorbing close to 60 percent of
the workers with high school or university degrees.
                                                       
2 To mitigate selection bias due to school attendance, I only use individuals aged 20 to 65.  In order to
avoid outliers due to mistakes in data entry, I ranked workers according to their wages and dropped the
top and bottom 0.5 percent of the sample. Another possible problem with the data is that not all the
household surveys report hourly income in the primary job.  Therefore, I run the wage regressions using
the hourly wage in all jobs (the value differs from the hourly income in primary job for individuals who
moonlight).  Panizza and Qiang (2000) show that there are no substantial differences in using the two
definitions of wage.
3 Table 2 reports simple averages (not weighted by country’s population).
4 Given the fact that my sample consists of middle income countries, I define high education as having
completed secondary school.8
Table 2: Composition of employment in Latin America:























All years 15.5 15.1 28.2 7 16.1 39.2 4.2
1995-1999 11.9 10.6 25.7 3.7 14.1 36.6 3.7






















All years 45.6 39.5 51.3 25.6 59.6 66.2 40.7
1995-1999 37.2 30.7 44.3 15.7 52.4 60.5 32.6
Table A1 shows that the 17 countries studied in this paper are far from being
homogeneous.  While Colombia, Guatemala, Chile, Paraguay, Honduras, and Ecuador
tend to have small public sectors, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, and
Uruguay have large public sectors (often more than 20 percent of the workers are
employed in the public sector).
Although within-country variation seems to be less important than cross-country
variation, in many countries we observe a dramatic reduction of the share of workers
employed in the public sector.  The most extreme case is Panama, where the share of
public sector workers dropped from 39 percent in 1979 to 22 percent in 1997.
5  Other
countries that experienced dramatic reduction in the share of public sector workers are
Bolivia (from 21 percent in 1990 to 12 percent in 1997), Costa Rica (from 24 percent in
1983 to 16 percent in 1997), Honduras (from 13 percent in 1989 to 9 percent in 1998),
and Venezuela (from 23 percent in 1981 to 16 percent in 1997).
3. Methodology
In this paper, I measure wage differentials between public and private sectors and between
male and female workers using a standard dummy variable approach.  This approach
consists of modeling the effect of sector (or gender) as an “intercept” effect while returns9
to other productivity-related characteristics and job attributes are restricted to be equal
across sectors or genders.  Formally, I estimate the public sector premium and the gender
gap using the following specifications:
                                                   i i i i u g P b X + + = w , (1)
i i i i v S X + + = g b w .  (2)
Where i w  is the log of hourly earnings, Xi a vector of productivity-related characteristics,
6
Pi is a dummy that takes value 1 when the employee works for the public sector and Si is a
dummy that takes a value 1 for female workers.  Within the specifications of Equations (1)
and (2), g measures the public sector premium and g  the gender gap.  I estimate Equation
(1) separately for men and women and Equation (2) separately for the public and private
sectors.  As the public sector premium and gender gap may not be constant for different
level of skills, I also estimate separate equations for workers with high and low levels of
education.
As I find that the public and private sectors tend to have different gender gaps (in
most countries the gender gap is lower in the public sector), I also compute the gender
gap differential by estimating the following equation:
                                                   i i i i i i i S P S g P b X e l g w + + + + = ) ( (3)
where wi, Xi, Pi, and Si are defined as in Equations (1) and (2) and PiSi is the interaction








man w w -  can
be interpreted as the differential between the gender gap of the private and public sectors
                                                                                                                                                                    
5 This dramatic reduction of the share of public sector workers was probably due to the privatization
process. Unfortunately, the available data do not allow testing this hypothesis.
6 I include the following controls: experience (defined as age – years of education – 6), experience
squared, 5 education dummies (some primary school, completed primary school, some secondary school,
completed secondary school, more than secondary school.  No schooling is the excluded dummy), 8
dummies for the sector of occupation (mining, manufacture, construction, water and electricity, retail,
restaurant and hotel, transport and telecommunications, financial services, and other services), and a
dummy for the area of residence (differentiating urban and rural areas).10
or as the differential in discrimination between the two sectors. As before, I estimate
Equation (3) for all workers and for workers with high and low education separately.
There are two possible problems with the estimation of Equations (1), (2), and (3).
First of all, they assume that men and women employed in the public and private sectors
have the same structure of returns (i.e., the vector b is the same for public and private
sector workers and the vector b is the same for men and women). Panizza and Qiang
(2000) address this issue by estimating the public sector premium and gender gap using
both the dummy variable approach and the Oaxaca (1973) decomposition and find that the
different methods yield similar results.
A more serious problem in the estimation of Equations (1) and (2) is that the
decision to participate in the labor market and the sorting of workers between public and
private sectors are likely to be non-random.  Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1988) show
that selection bias is an important issue in the estimation of public-private wage
differentials.  In particular, they find that controlling for selection bias lowers the estimated
size of the public sector premium and in some cases leads to the finding that public sector
workers are paid less than their private sector counterparts.  In the presence of non-
random selection between the public and private sectors one should perform maximum
likelihood estimations of the following switching regression model:
i i i pri i pub i B Z I e w w d + + - = ) ( , , (4)
i pub pub i i pub u b X , , + = w (5)
i pri pri i i pri u b X , , + = w (6)
Where Ii is a latent variable that determines the sector of employment of individual i, when
Ii>0 the individual is selected in the public sector otherwise in the private sector.   i pub, w
and  i pri, w are log wages in the public and private sectors, Z is a vector of characteristics
that are associated with the probability of obtaining a job in the public sector, and X is a
vector of productivity-related characteristics.  The main problem with the estimations of
the above model is identification.  In particular, it is very difficult to find a set of variables
that affect the probability of obtaining a public sector job but do not affect productivity
(i.e., a set of variables to be included in Z but not in X).  Without reasonable restrictions,11
the above system would only be identified by the non-linearity of Equation (4).  However,
since there are no clear theoretical reasons on why one should use a particular functional
form, the cure might be worse than the disease because, as pointed out by Manski (1989),
small  mis-specifications in the selection equation could generate large biases in the
estimates of the coefficients of interest.  Panizza and Qiang (2000) deal with the selection
problem by running a sensitivity analysis that assumes different values for the selectivity
bias.  Their main finding is that, in most Latin American countries, OLS estimations are
rather robust to a large range of values for the selectivity bias and find that the OLS
coefficients switch sign only when one assumes perfect selection in the public sector and
no selection in the private sector.
7  I am therefore confident that OLS estimations of
Equations (1), (2), and (3) will yield a fairly accurate measure of the public/private wage
differential and gender gap in Latin America.
4. Results
All in all, I estimate 27 regressions for each survey.  As reporting the whole set of results
would require more than 20 pages of tables, I only report country summaries and make
the whole data-set available on line (it can be downloaded from:
http://www.iadb.org/OCE/publications.htm ).  I this section, I discuss the main results and
summarize the data. Table 3 reports the average values for the whole sample and for the
1995-1999 period.  Country summaries are reported in the Appendix (Tables A2-A4).
                                                       
7 Perfect selection in the public sector and no selection in the private sector would imply that all those
employed in the public sector perform better in that sector than any random individual from the sample
and that all the workers employed in the private sector do not do better or worse than any random
individual.12
Table 3: Public sector premium and gender gap in Latin America













Public sector premium, men
All years 0.024 -0.004 0.044 0.002 -0.011 0.010
1995-1999 0.020 0.000 0.039 -0.015 -0.019 -0.016
Public sector premium, women
All years 0.228 0.088 0.316 0.086 0.026 0.141
1995-1999 0.207 0.085 0.283 0.060 0.005 0.111
Gender gap in the private sector
All years -0.290 -0.194 -0.324 -0.186 -0.135 -0.214
1995-1999 -0.283 -0.192 -0.318 -0.175 -0.128 -0.207
Gender gap in the public sector
All years -0.103 -0.087 -0.109
1995-1999 -0.109 -0.079 -0.115
Differential in discrimination
All years 0.176 0.114 0.199 0.073 0.063 0.082
1995-1999 0.168 0.113 0.179 0.062 0.058 0.060
4.1 Public Sector Premium
On average, the data indicate a small public sector premium for male workers (2 percent
for the whole sample and 4 percent when only low skilled workers are considered) which
is completely due to the fact that a large share of private sector workers are employed in
the informal sector.  In fact, when only formal sector workers are analyzed, the public
premium completely disappears.  The premium is much higher for women, ranging from 9
to 32 percent.  Although the premium decreases substantially when informal sector
workers are dropped from the sample, contrary to the case for men, it remains fairly high,
ranging from 3 to 14 percent.
While Table 3 gives a good bird’s-eye view of regional averages, it masks the
heterogeneity of the 17 countries studied in this paper. Table A2 in the Appendix
illustrates that there are large cross-country differences.  In particular, while Bolivia and
the Dominican Republic have large public sector penalties (as high as 40 percent), Costa
Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, and El Salvador have large public sector premia for both men
and women.  As in the case of Table 3, Table A2 suggests that the premia are often higher
for women and for workers with low education.13
Figures 1 and 2 compare the evolution of the public sector premium (solid line,
right scale) and public sector employment (line with diamonds, right scale) in selected
countries over the 1990s.  The figures show that during the last decade some countries
(Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Honduras) made a clear effort to reduce the size of the
public sector by cutting both public sector wages and public sector employment.  In
Panama and Venezuela, instead, we observe a reduction of public sector employment
accompanied by an increase in public sector wages and in Uruguay we observe an increase
of public sector employment accompanied by a decrease of the relative remuneration of
public sector workers.
4.2 Gender Gap
Table 3 shows that, on average, Latin American women who are employed in the private
sector earn 30 percent less than male workers with similar skills.  This is similar to what
was found, for the 1980s, by Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos (1992).  Table 3 also shows
that the gender gap drops by more than ten percentage points when only formal sector
workers are considered.  This indicates that approximately one third of the gender gap is
explained by lack of access to formal sector jobs.  The public sector gender gap is
approximately 10 percent, 20 percentage points lower than the private sector gender gap.
Furthermore, while the public sector gender gap is fairly homogenous across education
levels, in the private sector the gender gap is significantly higher (approximately 8
percentage points) when we only consider low-skilled workers.
Table A3 shows that there are not large cross-country differences in the private
sector gender gaps.  In fact, almost all countries (the exception is Nicaragua) have a high
and significant gender gap, ranging from 20 (Colombia) to 43 percent (Honduras).  The
situation is different when we look at the public sector.  Here, I find high (up to 36
percent) and significant gender gaps for Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Colombia,
Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela but no significant gender gap for the other eight
countries studied in this paper.  Interestingly, the lack of a gender gap in the public sector
seems to be a Central American phenomenon.  El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,14
Nicaragua, and Dominican Republic are five of the eight countries that do not have a
significant public sector gender gap (the other three are Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru).
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the evolution of the gender gap in the public and private
sectors over the 1990s for workers with high (solid line) and low education (line with
diamonds).  They show that, for both sectors, the gender gap is often larger for workers
with low levels of education and that there is not a well defined trend towards lower
gender gaps.
4.3 Differential in Discrimination
The last two rows of Table 3 report the differential in discrimination, i.e., the difference
between the private and public sector gender gaps obtained by estimating Equation (3).
The table suggests that, on average, female workers employed in the private sector suffer
a gender gap that is 17 percentage points higher than the public sector gender gap.  More
than half of this differential is explained by lack of access to the formal sector.  In fact, if
the sample is restricted to formal sector workers, the differential in discrimination drops by
10 percentage points to approximately 7 percent.  Also in this case there is a large cross-
country variation.  Table A4 shows that the differential in discrimination ranges from
almost 50 percent (Guatemala, Honduras, and Dominican Republic) to minus 8 percent
(Brazil).  However, the differential is positive in 14 (significant in 12) out of 17 countries
indicating that in most countries (the exceptions are Brazil, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) the
gender gap is significantly higher in the private sector.  Like Table 3, the last three
columns of Table A4 suggests that most of the discrimination occurs through lack of
access to formal sector jobs.
5. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to build a data set measuring gender gaps and earning
differentials between public and private sector workers.  For this purpose, I used a large
set of household surveys that cover 17 Latin American countries over the 1980-1998
period.  I find that, in most countries, the public sector pays considerable premia to low
skilled female workers, and that, in the majority of the countries, highly skilled male15
workers suffer a public sector penalty.  As for the gender gap, I find that, on average,
Latin American women working in the private sector earn 30 percent less than their male
counterparts.  The finding that the gender gap for formal sector workers is close to 20
percent suggests that approximately one third of the Latin American gender gap  is
explained by lack of access to the formal sector.
Besides describing the pattern and evolution of public sector premia and gender
gaps in Latin America, the main purpose of this paper was to make available to
researchers interested in this field the largest possible data-set on public-private pay
differentials and gender gaps in Latin America.  I hope that the availability of such data set
will stimulate research on the causes and determinants of public-private pay differentials.
One interesting avenue of research that I intend to pursue in future work is the study of
the links between public sector remuneration and efficiency of the public sector.  Other
interesting topics include the study of how fiscal variables affect public sector wages, and
the study of the regional composition of public sector employment.  Alesina et al. (1999),
for instance, find that in Italy public sector employment is the main avenue of
redistribution from the richer North to the poorer South.
With regards to the gender gap, it would be interesting to study what are the links
between gender gap and overall inequality. In an influential paper, Blau and Kahn (1996)
report that a considerable amount of cross-national variation in gender gaps is explained
by overall earnings inequality.  Thus, any public policies and programs that help in
narrowing the overall earnings distribution may also improve the relative standing of
women.16
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Table A1: Percentage of Workers employed in the public sector
All Workers Formal Sector Workers
All Men Women All Men Women
























Bolivia 90 0.206 0.219 0.356 0.128 0.186 0.461 0.064 0.641 0.591 0.728 0.438 0.758 0.820 0.612
Bolivia 93 0.175 0.174 0.260 0.092 0.176 0.373 0.030 0.440 0.376 0.439 0.270 0.579 0.620 0.363
Bolivia 96 0.120 0.110 0.273 0.042 0.138 0.371 0.041 0.403 0.343 0.477 0.196 0.539 0.627 0.355
Bolivia 97 0.118 0.103 0.240 0.032 0.146 0.363 0.033 0.341 0.271 0.409 0.118 0.510 0.583 0.297
Brazil 92 0.154 0.114 0.263 0.077 0.229 0.458 0.122 0.437 0.384 0.802 0.267 0.499 0.878 0.283
Brazil 93 0.160 0.118 0.268 0.080 0.235 0.453 0.129 0.443 0.394 0.791 0.276 0.500 0.869 0.290
Brazil 95 0.147 0.107 0.252 0.068 0.217 0.418 0.114 0.422 0.372 0.774 0.246 0.477 0.844 0.262
Brazil 96 0.147 0.106 0.245 0.066 0.218 0.401 0.116 0.415 0.361 0.745 0.233 0.473 0.818 0.262
Brazil 97 0.141 0.102 0.236 0.062 0.210 0.380 0.109 0.404 0.353 0.734 0.222 0.461 0.810 0.243
Chile 87 0.096 0.074 0.131 0.048 0.145 0.244 0.063 0.133 0.107 0.170 0.074 0.185 0.279 0.089
Chile 96 0.087 0.067 0.105 0.037 0.125 0.192 0.044 0.152 0.110 0.148 0.070 0.243 0.278 0.147
Colombia 90 0.080 0.073 0.127 0.034 0.090 0.155 0.028 0.119 0.115 0.183 0.056 0.125 0.196 0.043
Colombia 91 0.094 0.075 0.188 0.036 0.129 0.229 0.073 0.142 0.115 0.258 0.058 0.191 0.273 0.126
Colombia 93 0.096 0.089 0.157 0.047 0.106 0.181 0.043 0.143 0.139 0.224 0.078 0.147 0.225 0.067
Colombia 97 0.094 0.070 0.173 0.023 0.134 0.231 0.057 0.152 0.118 0.253 0.041 0.208 0.295 0.106
Colombia 98 0.092 0.069 0.168 0.022 0.130 0.226 0.053 0.153 0.117 0.247 0.040 0.210 0.291 0.107
Colombia 99 0.086 0.084 0.138 0.030 0.090 0.146 0.020 0.133 0.135 0.199 0.054 0.131 0.190 0.035
Costa Rica 83 0.236 0.207 0.439 0.140 0.318 0.574 0.153 0.419 0.376 0.555 0.290 0.534 0.691 0.345
Costa Rica 85 0.235 0.201 0.410 0.132 0.324 0.543 0.134 0.410 0.361 0.547 0.269 0.523 0.652 0.310
Costa Rica 87 0.203 0.171 0.377 0.109 0.282 0.526 0.120 0.320 0.276 0.623 0.175 0.420 0.761 0.182
Costa Rica 91 0.185 0.164 0.354 0.108 0.232 0.490 0.072 0.329 0.288 0.470 0.210 0.426 0.636 0.178
Costa Rica 93 0.188 0.162 0.324 0.106 0.247 0.476 0.073 0.324 0.274 0.429 0.199 0.441 0.625 0.180
Costa Rica 95 0.169 0.143 0.338 0.072 0.227 0.451 0.065 0.291 0.247 0.452 0.138 0.392 0.589 0.147
Costa Rica 97 0.164 0.126 0.306 0.065 0.245 0.493 0.064 0.299 0.231 0.427 0.134 0.443 0.614 0.174
Ecuador 95 0.108 0.102 0.237 0.053 0.117 0.274 0.028 0.263 0.227 0.362 0.140 0.347 0.425 0.174
Ecuador 98 0.098 0.089 0.214 0.036 0.113 0.255 0.029 0.236 0.198 0.334 0.097 0.320 0.405 0.152
Guatemala 98 0.062 0.059 0.228 0.035 0.068 0.288 0.024 0.166 0.139 0.377 0.087 0.236 0.413 0.115
Honduras 89 0.126 0.105 0.397 0.068 0.176 0.535 0.067 0.339 0.280 0.493 0.212 0.491 0.616 0.329
Honduras 92 0.134 0.105 0.356 0.055 0.194 0.521 0.068 0.301 0.232 0.446 0.145 0.441 0.611 0.243
Honduras 96 0.097 0.074 0.262 0.038 0.139 0.415 0.039 0.249 0.191 0.359 0.116 0.359 0.518 0.166
Honduras 97 0.089 0.066 0.237 0.034 0.129 0.367 0.043 0.230 0.173 0.334 0.107 0.324 0.465 0.166
Honduras 98 0.094 0.069 0.258 0.030 0.135 0.385 0.042 0.227 0.166 0.341 0.086 0.332 0.485 0.161
Mexico 94 0.146 0.122 0.271 0.078 0.200 0.446 0.070 0.354 0.303 0.415 0.237 0.457 0.570 0.274
Nicaragua 93 0.201 0.177 0.401 0.135 0.239 0.571 0.143 0.496 0.404 0.563 0.348 0.673 0.791 0.575
Panama 79 0.394 0.334 0.468 0.281 0.494 0.606 0.399
Panama 91 0.274 0.229 0.312 0.177 0.347 0.478 0.191 0.408 0.339 0.396 0.292 0.524 0.561 0.438
Panama 95 0.229 0.186 0.278 0.122 0.307 0.434 0.137 0.362 0.294 0.361 0.227 0.481 0.515 0.376
Panama 97 0.219 0.178 0.251 0.125 0.286 0.400 0.133 0.348 0.281 0.333 0.228 0.459 0.481 0.387
Paraguay 98 0.041 0.032 0.252 0.013 0.070 0.265 0.007 0.246 0.228 0.498 0.117 0.281 0.391 0.061
Paraguay 95 0.087 0.076 0.244 0.035 0.107 0.319 0.029 0.306 0.242 0.402 0.144 0.456 0.539 0.283
Peru 85 0.153 0.170 0.309 0.079 0.124 0.324 0.026 0.436 0.416 0.526 0.271 0.494 0.551 0.30222
Peru 91 0.182 0.191 0.279 0.071 0.167 0.268 0.042
Peru 94 0.137 0.128 0.202 0.049 0.154 0.282 0.022 0.358 0.311 0.377 0.176 0.456 0.517 0.174
Peru 85 0.112 0.109 0.188 0.033 0.116 0.237 0.007 0.287 0.251 0.338 0.103 0.376 0.478 0.047
Peru 97 0.120 0.115 0.185 0.036 0.128 0.228 0.023 0.320 0.281 0.344 0.137 0.405 0.456 0.191
Dom. Rep. 96 0.144 0.125 0.207 0.095 0.193 0.327 0.108 0.273 0.241 0.294 0.211 0.350 0.425 0.262
El Salv. 95 0.121 0.126 0.278 0.080 0.114 0.370 0.023 0.235 0.213 0.347 0.152 0.278 0.457 0.086
El Salv 97 0.123 0.132 0.276 0.083 0.111 0.339 0.020 0.218 0.214 0.353 0.148 0.223 0.425 0.052
El Salv 98 0.118 0.122 0.273 0.070 0.112 0.327 0.026 0.228 0.207 0.357 0.133 0.266 0.414 0.096
Uruguay 81 0.508 0.484 0.461 0.491 0.549 0.332 0.631 0.817 0.806 0.761 0.818 0.833 0.569 0.917
Uruguay 89 0.385 0.392 0.356 0.405 0.373 0.320 0.396 0.687 0.703 0.623 0.731 0.663 0.556 0.710
Uruguay 92 0.535 0.507 0.465 0.525 0.575 0.452 0.646 0.696 0.672 0.608 0.699 0.730 0.548 0.843
Uruguay 95 0.524 0.495 0.467 0.508 0.565 0.464 0.631 0.695 0.673 0.621 0.699 0.725 0.571 0.833
Uruguay 97 0.542 0.511 0.503 0.516 0.588 0.515 0.640 0.717 0.700 0.662 0.720 0.739 0.618 0.833
Venezuela 81 0.231 0.190 0.359 0.161 0.345 0.548 0.287 0.475 0.411 0.561 0.374 0.618 0.724 0.572
Venezuela 83 0.232 0.187 0.353 0.155 0.359 0.549 0.295 0.377 0.315 0.435 0.281 0.530 0.603 0.492
Venezuela 86 0.201 0.160 0.294 0.127 0.311 0.482 0.236 0.330 0.268 0.383 0.229 0.481 0.557 0.429
Venezuela 89 0.201 0.157 0.281 0.119 0.304 0.448 0.231 0.323 0.257 0.376 0.209 0.467 0.528 0.420
Venezuela 93 0.169 0.125 0.215 0.092 0.266 0.370 0.197 0.279 0.210 0.288 0.171 0.421 0.450 0.389
Venezuela 95 0.179 0.130 0.237 0.088 0.281 0.410 0.189 0.345 0.259 0.361 0.201 0.506 0.542 0.457
Venezuela 97 0.161 0.118 0.221 0.073 0.239 0.344 0.157 0.322 0.238 0.339 0.171 0.473 0.495 0.44023
Table A2: Public/private wage differentials, country averages










Bolivia -0.173 * -0.193 * -0.216 * -0.135 * -0.181 -0.118
Brazil 0.021 0.041 0.029 * 0.365 * 0.462 * 0.305 *
C.Rica 0.171 * 0.149 * 0.165 * 0.143 * 0.102 * 0.155 *
Chile -0.025 -0.068 -0.060 * 0.022 -0.042 0.018
Colombia 0.163 * 0.115 * 0.228 * 0.182 * 0.137 * 0.211 *
Ecuador 0.301 * 0.198 * 0.431 * 0.189 * 0.104 * 0.310 *
El. Salv. 0.267 * 0.131 0.372 * 0.199 * 0.127 0.265 *
Guatemala -0.045 0.060 -0.169 -0.136 0.041 -0.285 *
Honduras 0.014 0.046 -0.026 * -0.101 -0.043 -0.176 *
Mexico 0.110 * 0.070 0.109 * 0.007 -0.035 0.010
Nicaragua -0.022 -0.191 0.039 -0.090 -0.181 -0.060
Panama 0.114 * -0.067 0.253 * -0.127 * -0.196 * -0.056 *
Paraguay 0.108 -0.132 0.432 * -0.024 -0.257 0.250
Peru 0.049 0.007 0.106 -0.043 -0.098 0.039
Dom. Rep. -0.368 * -0.277 * -0.435 * -0.319 * -0.228 * -0.388 *
Uruguay -0.015 0.034 * -0.031 -0.138 * -0.045 -0.190 *










Bolivia 0.013 * -0.056 0.030 -0.062 -0.098 0.000
Brazil -0.077 * -0.061 * -0.107 * 0.241 * 0.300 * 0.150 *
C.Rica 0.470 * 0.226 * 0.580 * 0.209 * 0.117 0.299 *
Chile 0.167 * 0.012 0.320 * 0.103 * 0.001 * 0.192
Colombia 0.266 * 0.185 * 0.310 * 0.257 * 0.191 * 0.259
Ecuador 0.259 * 0.266 * 0.428 * 0.135 0.078 0.326
El. Salv. 0.670 * 0.396 * 0.826 * 0.415 * 0.289 * 0.522 *
Guatemala 0.396 * 0.380 * 0.443 * 0.242 * 0.269 * 0.135
Honduras 0.602 * 0.206 * 0.799 * 0.172 * 0.103 0.260
Mexico 0.233 * 0.123 * 0.283 * 0.110 * 0.079 0.147 *
Nicaragua 0.022 -0.144 0.103 -0.127 -0.382 0.019
Panama 0.488 * 0.265 * 0.639 * 0.134 0.029 0.158
Paraguay 0.279 0.165 0.853 * 0.019 -0.054 0.365
Peru 0.105 * 0.048 0.034 0.054 0.002 0.250
Dom. Rep. 0.231 0.022 0.370 -0.008 0.008 -0.034
Uruguay -0.036 0.019 * -0.035 -0.215 * -0.101 -0.305 *
Venezuela 0.267 * 0.090 * 0.341 * 0.068 * 0.046 * 0.068
* means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1% in most regressions24
Table A3: Wage gender gaps, country averages










Bolivia -0.248 * -0.180 * -0.287 * -0.203 * -0.156 * -0.291 *
Brazil -0.321 * -0.333 * -0.306 * -0.251 * -0.314 * -0.229 *
C.Rica -0.252 * -0.173 * -0.271 * -0.206 * -0.163 * -0.212 *
Chile -0.349 * -0.292 * -0.358 * -0.271 * -0.235 * -0.243 *
Colombia -0.203 * -0.133 * -0.232 * -0.150 * -0.096 * -0.178 *
Ecuador -0.421 * -0.165 * -0.53 * -0.175 * -0.069 -0.286 *
El. Salv. -0.321 * -0.251 * -0.341 * -0.189 * -0.157 * -0.197 *
Guatemala -0.413 * -0.203 * -0.454 * -0.377 * -0.113 -0.456 *
Honduras -0.429 * -0.211 * -0.484 * -0.181 * -0.138 * -0.214 *
Mexico -0.346 * -0.123 * -0.412 * -0.160 * -0.131 * -0.195 *
Nicaragua -0.029 -0.111 -0.015 -0.009 0.187 -0.072
Panama -0.287 * -0.198 * -0.326 * -0.222 * -0.190 * -0.223 *
Paraguay -0.285 * -0.223 * -0.314 * -0.208 -0.198 -0.195
Peru -0.258 * -0.201 * -0.294 * -0.208 * -0.157 * -0.294 *
Dom. Rep. -0.346 * -0.166 * -0.420 * -0.204 * -0.171 * -0.214 *
Uruguay -0.259 * -0.169 * -0.298 * -0.116 * -0.065 * -0.139 *






Bolivia -0.135 * -0.114 -0.091
Brazil -0.363 * -0.327 * -0.387 *
C.Rica -0.073 * -0.052 * -0.087 *
Chile -0.279 * -0.273 * -0.128 *
Colombia -0.104 * -0.071 * -0.181 *
Ecuador -0.159 * -0.083 -0.319 *
El. Salv. -0.008 0.018 -0.069
Guatemala 0.012 -0.074 0.199
Honduras 0.010 0.024 0.012
Mexico -0.053 -0.049 -0.054
Nicaragua -0.027 -0.054 -0.030
Panama -0.121 * -0.066 * -0.177 *
Paraguay -0.076 -0.041 -0.040
Peru -0.080 -0.068 -0.136
Dom. Rep. 0.084 0.045 0.179 *
Uruguay -0.306 * -0.221 * -0.310 *
Venezuela -0.091 * -0.051 * -0.105 *
* means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1% in most regressions25
Table A4: Differential in discrimination, country averages









Bolivia 0.107 0.065 0.117 0.026 0.041 0.100
Brazil -0.080 * -0.045 -0.127 * -0.137 * -0.080 -0.199 *
C.Rica 0.201 * 0.111 0.217 * 0.126 * 0.105 0.120
Chile 0.084 0.019 0.247 * 0.000 * -0.036 0.135
Colombia 0.073 * 0.057 * -0.011 0.017 0.024 -0.099 *
Ecuador 0.215 * 0.071 0.214 -0.027 -0.025 -0.012
El. Salv. 0.300 * 0.278 * 0.293 * 0.165 0.189 * 0.140
Guatemala 0.491 * 0.190 0.693 * 0.447 * 0.088 0.685 *
Honduras 0.460 * 0.250 * 0.511 * 0.207 * 0.179 * 0.212
Mexico 0.311 * 0.163 * 0.314 * 0.160 * 0.181 * 0.144 *
Nicaragua -0.027 0.068 -0.016 -0.045 -0.210 0.041
Panama 0.210 * 0.148 * 0.244 * 0.127 * 0.134 * 0.087
Paraguay 0.165 * 0.224 * 0.289 * 0.025 0.132 0.005
Peru 0.164 * 0.125 * 0.055 0.159 * 0.141 * 0.093
Dom. Rep. 0.480 * 0.274 * 0.625 * 0.332 * 0.298 * 0.396 *
Uruguay -0.045 -0.056 -0.018 -0.097 * -0.085 -0.132 *
Venezuela 0.211 * 0.124 * 0.230 * 0.115 * 0.116 * 0.104 *
* means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1% in most regressions